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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the eﬀ  ects of cross-border M&As on invest-
ing ﬁ  rms’ domestic performance in the U.K. and France. We build a new ﬁ  rm-level 
dataset that combines a global M&A database with balance sheet data for the years 
2000–2007. Combining matching techniques with a diﬀ  erence-in-diﬀ  erences estima-
tor, we ﬁ  nd that cross-border deals boost on average domestic employment, sales, 
and investment, and they are not accompanied by a downsizing of the domestic 
labor force in neither of both countries. Further, acquisitions in knowledge-intensive 
industries lead to improvements in domestic productivity. Our results display some 
heterogeneity across industries and types of acquisitions, suggesting a connection 
between the motives for international acquisitions and their resulting eﬀ  ects.
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The globalization of the economy still causes heated debates in most developed countries. Ad-
vocates point out productivity improvements in ﬁrms that decide to ‘go global’. These could
either stem from cost differences between countries or from access to new technologies helping
ﬁrms to stay competitive. Opponents, in contrast, fear both the replacement of jobs if ﬁrms
indeed decide to relocate production abroad, and the loss in bargaining power of workers and
sequent wage reductions due to the thread of offshoring alone. What is often ignored in the dis-
cussion is the diversity of the ﬁrms’ possible internationalization strategies. A ﬁrm that decides
to produce abroad can choose to acquire an existing foreign ﬁrm - cross-border mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&As) - or to build a new ﬁrm abroad, usually referred to as Greenﬁeld investment.1
Cross-border M&As have increased sharply in the last two decades. In years of merger waves,
cross-border M&A ﬂows amounted up to 80% of global foreign direct investment (FDI).2 As
they constitute a major share of transnational investment, cross-border M&As as a form of FDI
started to receive more and more attention in the international trade literature recently (see, for
example, Nocke & Yeaple, 2007, 2008; Neary, 2007; Head & Ries, 2003). Meanwhile, empiri-
cal evidence of the effects of cross-border M&As is still sparse and mostly limited to the analysis
of the impact on the target ﬁrms, whereas there is almost no empirical work on the effects on the
investing enterprises.3
A separate analysis of cross-border M&As and their impact on the acquiring ﬁrm is im-
portant for several reasons. First, recent theoretical contributions stress the importance of het-
erogeneity in ﬁrm characteristics and the role of the different motives behind the choice be-
tween Greenﬁeld entries versus cross-border M&As (Nocke & Yeaple, 2007; Norbäck & Pers-
son, 2007). While M&As are frequently driven by the acquisition of complementary assets and
technology, Greenﬁeld investments do not provide direct access to the foreign stock of knowl-
edge. Therefore, the resulting effects regarding productivity and substitution of production may
vary across foreign entry modes. Second, the few empirical M&A studies that compare the
determinants of international and domestic deals ﬁnd that motives for cross-border M&As are
quite different from those of national deals (Shimizu et al., 2004), which impedes the general-
ization of results found in the M&A literature. Third, complementing the work on the effects on
1We do not address the decision to outsource versus producing in-house in this paper.
2http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=1254 (accessed March 5, 2009)
3E.g. Girma & Görg (2004) and Bandick & Görg (forthcoming) analyze the eﬀects on survival
and employment, and Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006); Harris & Robinson (2003) look at productivity
spillovers in target ﬁrms. Breinlich (2008) is one study that considers both sides of a deal comparing
characteristics of acquirers and target ﬁrms, however he does not address the eﬀects on the involved
ﬁrms.
4the target ﬁrm with an analysis of the investors’ side, we add to the discussion on the evaluation
of cross-border M&As. On the one hand, many governments restrict the acquisition of ﬁrms
in technology-intensive or other key industries. Welfare effects of such mutual restrictions of
cross-border acquisitions, however, depend on the effects of both sides involved in a deal. On
the other hand, in the case of cross-border deals it matters from a policy makers’ perspective,
whether substitution and efﬁciency effects take place at the target or at the acquiring ﬁrm, and
thus in the domestic or foreign country.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical investigation that explicitly deals with
the home country effects of cross-border acquisitions at the ﬁrm-level. Our paper ﬁlls this gap
and aims to identify the effects of cross-border M&As on domestic growth and productivity of
the investing ﬁrm.
To provide ﬁrst evidence on the effects of cross-border M&As, we construct a unique ﬁrm-
level data set that combines ﬁnancial data of ﬁrms from the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France
with a global M&A database for the years 2000-2007. Both the U.K. and France are among the
top ﬁve countries with respect to cross-border acquisitions worldwide, so the potential effects of
acquisitions should be pronounced. Furthermore, these countries differ with respect to several
institutional characteristics, such as labor laws and ﬁnancial institutions, which allows more
general conclusions. We implement matching techniques in combination with a difference-in-
differences estimator to control for selection based on observable characteristics as well as for
time-invariant unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity.
We ﬁnd that cross-border deals boost domestic sales growth on average, and they are not
accompanied by a downsizing of the domestic labor force in neither of the two countries. Our
results show signiﬁcant average productivity gains as a consequence of cross-border M&As
for French acquirers, but not for British ﬁrms. Separate estimations for related and unrelated
deals as proxies for horizontal and other investments, respectively, and for industries of different
technological intensity reveal an overall positive effect on domestic production. Changes in
domestic investment and employment growth vary across industries and types of acquisitions,
however never indicate a substitution effect. Heterogeneity is also found with respect to changes
in productivity, where a positive effect follows acquisitions in technology-intensive sectors only.
These ﬁndings suggest a connection between the motives for international M&As and their
resulting impacts. Apparently, the substitution of activity at home by cheaper production abroad
does not appear to be the main motive for cross-border M&As, which is the dominant mode of
investment between developed countries. Those deals seem to either serve foreign market entry
or – in particular in technology-intensive industries – they are rather motivated by the possibility
to access the technology and knowledge stock of the foreign target ﬁrm.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, previous research on FDI
and M&As is discussed, section 3 describes our estimation strategy and section 4 provides a
description of the data. Results of the empirical analysis are presented in section 5 with some
robustness checks in chapter 6; section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Several strands of literature are relevant for the effects of cross-border M&As on the investing
ﬁrm. We ﬁrst look at the M&A literature that is usually focused on domestic acquisitions. There
is evidence, however, that cross-border investments differ considerably from national acquisi-
tions. Therefore, we additionally try to extract predictions from the FDI literature that does not
consider the particular mode of foreign market entry. Overall, theoretical predictions regarding
substitution effects and efﬁciency gains after M&As depend crucially on the underlying motives
that determine the investment (see Shimizu et al., 2004).
If M&As are characterized as a natural selection process in which underperforming ﬁrms
are targeted, positive effects on the efﬁciency of the combined ﬁrm can be expected (Morck
et al., 1989). The higher the underperformance of target ﬁrms, the higher the potential for value
gains and thus proﬁts for the acquiring ﬁrms. Since the costs of mounting a takeover are often
extremely high, it is sometimes argued that they can only be proﬁtable if the target ﬁrm dis-
plays serious underperformance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), or if there are important gains in
efﬁciency (Jovanovic & Braguinsky, 2004). Other motives are attempts to undermine competi-
tion in product markets (Kamien & Zang, 1990) or technology markets (Grimpe & Hussinger,
2008b) via the acquisition of main competitors. Furthermore, recent theoretical and empirical
contributions argue that technology shocks are a main driver of M&As which reallocate assets
to more efﬁcient ﬁrms (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008). Similarly, M&As play an important role
in ﬁrms’ responses to trade liberalization, where more productive ﬁrms acquire targets with a
lower productivity level that suffer from increased competition in the home market (Breinlich,
2008).
Yet, there are other motives for M&As that do not necessarily imply efﬁciency increases
related to the discussion on unproﬁtable M&As (Budzinski & Kretschmer, 2009). Since most
M&As are conducted by public corporations that are typically not owner-led, M&As may be
a result of failure in corporate governance mechanism in the acquiring ﬁrms (see Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997, for an overview). If these investments arise out of managers’ utility maximization,
which may include preferences for expansion and a large number of employees under control
(“Empire-building” motive (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1988)), efﬁciency might not improve after
6the deal. Hence, these investments do not necessarily yield a maximization of shareholder value.
Similarly, according to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), managers have a preference
to reinvest free cash rather than to return it to investors. Finally, even if managers really hope
to achieve efﬁciency gains, it might be difﬁcult to attain them if synergies cannot be realized as
well as expected in the post-merger integration process. Concluding, the effects of M&As on
efﬁciency can be both positive and negative from a theoretical point of view. Empirical evidence
available in the form of event studies reports declining stock prices of acquiring ﬁrms in advance
of a merger, but rising stock prices of target ﬁrms (Andrade et al., 2001) supported by anecdotic
evidence (Jensen, 1986). Similarly, while several empirical studies ﬁnd productivity effects of
M&As on the combined entity (see, e.g., Conyon et al., 2002b; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001),
this does not necessarily reﬂect efﬁciency gains in the acquiring ﬁrm, especially in diversifying
acquisitions (compare Schoar, 2002).
Supposing that efﬁciency gains indeed existed, a crucial point for policy makers is the source
of these improvements. Policy makers and trade unions often argue that efﬁciency gains are the
result of rationalization, especially of downsizing the workforce. Shleifer & Summers (1998)
argue that M&As provide an opportunity to cancel implicit contracts with trade unions or em-
ployees. Empirical evidence regarding the employment consequences of M&As is mixed. Harris
et al. (2005) report that productivity increases after ownership changes are at least partly due to
a layoff of workers, disinvestment and outsourcing of production stages. Gugler & Yurtoglu
(2004) ﬁnd that on average, M&As within Europe do involve a downsizing of the labor force
in the merged ﬁrm, while this is not the case for U.S. deals. They trace the difference back to
more rigid labor markets in Europe. These cross-country differences show up in further studies.
Conyon et al. (2002a) ﬁnd that after an M&A, employment shrinks in the combined ﬁrm, and
Amess et al. (2008) report negative employment adjustment at the acquired ﬁrm using a sam-
ple of U.K. targets. In contrast, McGuckin & Nguyen (2001), among others, ﬁnd that acquired
plants in the U.S. are characterized by faster employment growth after the acquisition than other
plants.
Furthermore, all cited studies so far refer to national M&As only with the exception of
Breinlich (2008). Yet, the characteristics of cross-border deals are quite different from those of
national deals (Shimizu et al., 2004). Grimpe & Hussinger (2008a) ﬁnd that acquisitions that
aim to access foreign markets are on average much larger than national deals. One explanation
is that information asymmetries – which are generally larger for foreign targets – are less severe
for larger and listed ﬁrms. Frey & Hussinger (2006) ﬁnd that technological relatedness (in
terms of the patent portfolio) of acquirer and target is a signiﬁcant determinant of cross-border
acquisitions, but not of domestic ones. This probably reﬂects that competition in technology
7markets mainly takes place internationally. Cross-border deals are also associated with higher
uncertainty and with higher risk of failure (Bertrand & Zuniga, 2006; Harris & Ravenscraft,
1991). Further, (transaction) costs are higher due to the larger cultural distance and institutional
differences (di Giovanni, 2005). In general, (geographical) distance increases the (marginal)
costs of monitoring (Degryse & Ongena, 2005) and for transmitting tacit knowledge (Blanc &
Sierra, 1999). Therefore, acquirers might require a higher expected return from cross-border
acquisitions than from domestic deals in order to compensate for the higher costs and risks that
are associated with these transactions.
The observed different nature of cross-border deals can be traced back to additional motives
for cross-border transactions that can be derived from the FDI literature. Foreign market access
is one important reason for cross-border acquisitions. This type of market-seeking cross-border
M&As is usually referred to as horizontal investment. In contrast to exporting and Greenﬁeld in-
vestment, cross-border M&As provide access to existing products that are suitable to and proven
and tested in the foreign market. In addition, access to existing networks with customers and
suppliers is provided (see Görg, 2000, e.g.). Head & Ries (1997) cite market power as another
main motive for cross-border M&As, while Nocke & Yeaple (2007, 2008) provide a model
where cross-border M&As are conducted to exploit complementarities in the acquirer’s and the
target’s resources; both strategies are singular for cross-border M&As compared to Greenﬁeld
investment. In addition, there is also scope for factor-seeking vertical investment activity in
analogy to Head & Ries (2003). The acquired ﬁrm, typically located in regions with lower labor
costs, then performs part of the ﬁrm’s production process at a lower cost.
The multiplicity of motives for cross-border M&A makes it hard to predict their potential
effects on the investing ﬁrm’s input decisions and efﬁciency. While vertical M&As may sub-
stitute domestic production at the extensive margin, horizontal deals are less suspect to reduce
domestic investment and employment if they are not associated with a substitution of domestic
export activity. Contrariwise, substitution at the intensive margin is more probable after horizon-
tal M&As as production can be easier shifted between similar ﬁrms. In case of technology driven
cross-border M&As, the acquirer’s productivity can be expected to rise due to the acquired com-
plementaryknowledge. Iflessproductivestagesoftheproductionareshiftedtowardstheforeign
country due to cost saving motives, efﬁciency gains can also be realized. However, if substitu-
tion of exporting activities indeed takes place after horizontal cross-border M&As, efﬁciency in
the home country could also be negatively affected, as the ﬁrm loses economies of scale.
Several empirical contributions analyze the effects of FDI on the productivity of multina-
tional ﬁrms and accompanying substitution effects on their domestic investment and labor with-
8out taking into account the different modes of foreign entry.4 The results from these studies are
mixed, especially regarding the question whether FDI is a substitute for or complementary to
domestic activity. The differences in the results may partly stem from institutional differences
and distinct industry structures across countries and from a mixture of the extensive and the in-
tensive margin of FDI. In addition, neglecting cross-country heterogeneity in the composition of
FDI makes it impossible to derive unambiguously the effects of these investments.
As the theoretical literature does not predict unambiguous effects, the issue whether cross-
border acquirers can realize efﬁciency gains and substitute domestic activity boils down to an
empirical question. The empirical literature, however, either deals with national deals or looks
at FDI ﬂows in the aggregate, and the effect of cross-border acquisitions on the acquirers is still
an open question. With this paper, we aim to provide ﬁrst evidence.
3 Estimation
Our empirical strategy aims to identify the causal impact of cross-border M&As on the perfor-
mance of the acquiring ﬁrm. We employ a propensity score matching procedure combined with
a difference-in-differences estimator. This empirical strategy is prominent in labor market eval-
uation studies (see Heckman et al., 1997, as an example) and became popular in the international
trade literature, where Wagner (2002), among others, started to address the impact of exporting
on productivity and ﬁrm size using a similar methodology.5
The evaluation of a treatment effects on the treated 𝑠 periods after treatment at time 𝑡 com-
prises a comparison between the actual outcome and the situation had the ﬁrm not invested
abroad.
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑦1
𝑡+𝑠∣𝑋𝑡−1,𝐶𝐵 𝑡 =1 ]− 𝐸[𝑦0
𝑡+𝑠∣𝑋𝑡−1,𝐶𝐵 𝑡 =1 ] (1)
where 𝑦1 is the outcome of an acquirer, 𝑦0 the outcome of the acquirer had it not invested abroad,
𝑋 contains a set of control variables, and 𝐶𝐵is a binary indicator of cross-border M&A activity
taking the value one if the ﬁrm acquirers at least one foreign target in the respective year.
As the counterfactual situation 𝐸[𝑦0
𝑡+𝑠∣𝑋𝑡−1,𝐶𝐵 𝑡 =1 ]is not observable, the evaluation
problem is often framed as a missing data problem. The main task is to construct a consistent
4See for example Desai et al. (2008), Pfaﬀermayr (2004), Becker & Muendler (2006), Konings &
Murphy (2006), or Muendler & Becker (2009) on employment; Navaretti & Castellani (2004), Jäckle
(2006) or Damijan et al. (2007) for productivity, Fors & Svensson (2002) for R&D, and Desai et al.
(2005) for investment.
5See Girma & Görg (2007), Greenaway & Kneller (2008), and Yasar & Rejesus (2005) for further
applications of the matching estimator to research questions regarding the eﬀects of exporting and FDI.
9estimate for the average outcome of acquirers had they not invested abroad.
The average outcome of the non-acquirers does not provide a good estimate of the counter-
factual in non-experimental settings as ﬁrms select themselves into the different groups based
on characteristics that might also inﬂuence the measured outcome. We use matching techniques
to construct a comparison group. The goal of the matching procedure is to identify matches of
acquirers and non-acquirers that are similar to each other with respect to a range of observable
characteristics. The expected outcome of this comparison group provides a valid construction
of the counterfactual outcome under the conditional independence assumption. The conditional
independence assumption requires the potential outcome to be independent of the treatment as-
signment given the set of observable control variables that are not inﬂuenced by the treatment.
𝑦1,𝑦0 ⊥ 𝐶𝐵∣𝑋 (2)
That is, we assume that selection into treatment is on observable characteristics only and that un-
observable variables do not inﬂuence simultaneously the treatment assignment and the outcome
determination. This assumption is not testable, but the inclusion of a wide range of covariates
that are suggested by theory helps to justify the validity of the approach (Caliendo & Kopeinig,
2008).
The number of relevant variables to be included is large, hence we take advantage of Rosen-
baum & Rubin’s (1983) results: if the conditional independence holds conditional on 𝑋, it will
also be true for the balancing score. We implement a logit estimation and use the predicted
probability of a cross-border deal as the balancing propensity score:
ˆ 𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑡−1)=Λ (ˆ 𝗽𝑋𝑡−1) (3)
where Λ is the cumulative logistic probability function. The matrix 𝑋𝑡−1 contains only pre-deal
characteristics from period 𝑡 − 1 to avoid reverse causality problems (Caliendo & Kopeinig,
2008). The best match is a ﬁrm not active in cross-border M&As with the propensity score that
is closest to the acquirer’s score.
As our dataset is a panel, we can release the strong assumption of selection on observables
by combining the matching technique with a difference-in differences estimator (Blundell &
Costa Dias, 2000). Instead of comparing differences in the levels of the outcome variables
between the two groups we focus on the growth rates. This procedure allows the decision to
engage in a cross-border acquisition to be based on the expected returns to this investment and
on time-invariant unobservables (Heckman et al., 1997). The difference-in-differences estimator
10for the effect of cross-border acquisitions can be expressed as follows:
𝜏𝐷𝐼𝐷 = 𝐸[𝑦1
𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑦1
𝑡−1∣𝑋𝑡−1,𝐶𝐵 𝑡 =1 ]− 𝐸[𝑦0
𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑦0
𝑡−1∣𝑋𝑡−1,𝐶𝐵 𝑡 =1 ] (4)
Still, unobserved time-varying factors that differ across groups and inﬂuence both the treatment
and outcome variables as well as differential reactions to common macroeconomic shocks would
lead to inconsistent results.
The second assumption for the validity of matching, the overlap condition, requires for each
set of 𝑋𝑡−1 of all treated and control ﬁrms a positive probability to be involved in a cross-border
deal.
0 <𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑡−1) < 1 (5)
This guarantees that a suitable match for each acquirer is in principle available and no perfect
prediction based on 𝑋𝑡−1 is possible. This assumption is less critical in the present case, as
the share of acquirers in cross-border deals is small and the pool of potential matches is quite
extensive. The results presented are based on estimations where the common support condition
is imposed, acquirers off common support are not included.6 Furthermore, one has to decide
whether the matching procedure is carried out with or without replacement. Basically, this
choice involves a tradeoff between bias and variance. We decide to perform the propensity score
matching with replacement, as in the British sample the balancing quality is reduced consider-
ably in the version without replacement. Therefore, we calculate the variance of the matching
estimator with a correction for matching estimators with replacement as suggested by Lechner
(1999) to account for the repeated use of several matches.7
One potential concern with the propensity score estimation is that the decision of ﬁrms in
our comparison group might be affected by the acquirers’ decision to invest abroad. Our ap-
proach is valid only if the stable unit treatment assumption holds, i.e. if there are no signiﬁcant
general equilibrium effects. If acquirers hamper domestic growth of competitors in the compar-
ison group due to strategic interaction, our results might overestimate the effect of cross-border
M&As. For this to happen, however, ﬁrms would have to be direct competitors in a market,
i.e. only if the demand for the acquirer directly affects the non-acquirers’ market position. The
substitutability of products within two-digit industries – which we use in the estimation of the
propensity score – is probably limited. This clearly reduces the risk of overestimation. In ad-
dition, the problem is probably even less severe in our application as only a small fraction of
6Only six French ﬁrms and two of the U.K. sample are oﬀ common support, compare table 4.
7The propensity-score matching and covariate balance testing is carried out using Leuven & Sianesi’s
(2003) software psmatch2 in STATA
R ⃝10.
11ﬁrms engages in cross-border M&As and hence average interaction effects are probably small
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
4 Data and Model Speciﬁcation
4.1 Data
We compile a unique ﬁrm-level data set that combines ﬁnancial data for European ﬁrms with
a global M&A database covering the years 2000-2007. The ﬁnancial data is taken from the
Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk, which provides information on ﬁrms’ balance
sheet, and proﬁt and loss accounts for up to ten years. The data is collected from company
reports which are supplemented by specialized regional information providers. Amadeus has
been used in numerous empirical studies on FDI (see Helpman et al., 2004; Budd et al., 2005, as
examples). Combining several updates of the Amadeus database, we are able to consider entry
and exit of ﬁrms and thus, a broader sample of ﬁrms to identify acquirers in cross-border deals.8
We merge the observations from Amadeus with the transaction data from our second data
source, the Zephyr database, an M&A database from the same provider. Zephyr includes data on
M&As, IPOs, joint ventures and private equity transactions and provides information about date
and value of a deal, the source of ﬁnancing as well as a description of the type of transaction,
and the ﬁrms involved in the deal. We are thus able to identify the sequent foreign investments
and to reconstruct the growing international commitment of ﬁrms. Compared to other M&A
data sources like Thompson Financial Securities data, the Zephyr database has the advantage
that there is no minimum deal value for a transaction to be included in the data set.9
The data structure of this new combined European ﬁrm level data set allows us to focus
explicitly on cross-border M&A. Moreover, we try to identify differences in the effects of cross-
border M&A across countries. Since the availability of balance sheet data - which is necessary to
calculate our productivity measure - varies considerably across countries we restrict our analysis
to ﬁrms from the U.K. and France. Both countries belong to the top ﬁve countries with respect to
the number of acquiring ﬁrms in international deals (Brakman et al., 2006) and are characterized
8Update numbers 88, 113, 136, 146 and 168 are used. Although Amadeus provides information on
subsidiaries, this information is only available at one point in time for each update. Further, the data
does not allow for a deﬁnite distinction between newly founded subsidiaries and existing ﬁrms that have
been acquired.
9When comparing aggregate statistics derived from own calculations of the Zephyr database with
those from Thompson ﬁnancial data as used in Brakman et al. (2006), we found that the coverage of
transactions with a deal value above 10 million US$ is very similar. Calculations are available upon
request.
12by several institutional differences. While the former exhibits a market-based ﬁnancial system
and ﬂexible labor markets, France features a more bank-based ﬁnancial system and highly rigid
labor markets.
The FDI deﬁnition applied by the OECD (1999) refers to foreign investment of at least
10% in order to seperate portfolio investments from investment with a lasting interest in and
relevant inﬂuence on the foreign ﬁrm. For the purpose of our paper, we consider only deals
where a substantial change in the stakes hold is involved as it is usual in the M&A literature.
The presented results only refer to M&As where the stake controlled rises from below 25% to
above 25% threshold as ﬁrms gain at least a blocking minority.
In our sample, we delete enterprises with a median value of annual sales and total assets
below e2 million based on all available ﬁrm-year observations, and ﬁrms active in the primary
sector (NACE two-digit industry codes 1-14) as these enterprises are usually not taking an active
part in cross-border M&As. We further deleted holding companies (NACE 7415), ﬁrms from
the public sector (NACE 75, 91), and ﬁnancial companies (NACE 65-67) as the deﬁnition of
output or sales and hence any measure of total factor productivity in ﬁnancial companies is not
comparable to other ﬁrms. Inspecting the growth rates of variables like ﬁrm size and number
of employees, we delete large outliers at both ends of the distribution as they could indicate an
unreported merger. After applying standard cleaning procedures10 and restricting the sample to
observations that have data for all necessary variables in at least four consecutive years, we are
left with 270 French ﬁrms and 646 British ﬁrms with at least one cross-border deal recorded.
We classify deals where the main activity of the acquirer equals the target’s activity at the NACE
two-digit level as related deals, which are used as a proxy for horizontal M&As. Different
NACE codes suggest unrelated M&As. The share of observations that display related deals only
is around 52% in both countries (compare table 5), in line with the share of horizontal deals
reported in other studies (see Brakman et al., 2006, for example).
4.2 Construction of variables and model speciﬁcation
We evaluate the impact of international acquisitions on several outcome variables. Growth rates
in capital (measured as tangible ﬁxed assets), sales and employment are analyzed to evaluate
whether international acquisitions complement or substitute domestic investment and whether a
possible rise in efﬁciency is accompanied by rationalization in production factors. In addition,
total factor productivity (TFP) is a further considered as an outcome variable. We implement
10We deleted observations with implausible values such as negative input factors or R&D intensities
above one, and with growth rates larger than the 199. and smaller than the ﬁrst 200-quantile.
13the Olley & Pakes’ (1996) estimation algorithm where we use investments to control for unob-
served productivity shocks that induce a simultaneity problem in TFP estimation. This method
is restricted to observations with strictly positive investment in order to guarantee a necessary
invertability condition, unfortunately introducing a selection problem.11 We calculate TFP for
all observations with sales, labor, and capital ﬁgures available.
Regarding the choice of control variables that are included in the Logit model, theoretical
models suggest a systematic selection into foreign investment activity according to the ﬁrms’
productivity levels. Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) theoretically derived a heteroge-
neous ﬁrm model of international trade, where ﬁrms select themselves into exporting and FDI,
respectively. The predicted observed productivity ranking could be conﬁrmed in several empir-
ical investigations.12 To control for the selection of more productive ﬁrms into foreign markets
we include the level of TFP before the acquisition.
We include the log of the number of employees as a measure of ﬁrm size to capture the
ﬁrms’ ability to realize economies of scale as well as their capacity of taking risks through inter-
nal diversiﬁcation. The log average wage (total labor costs divided by the number of employees)
accounts for different skill structures of the labor force. The log capital stock captures differ-
ences in the production process and controls for the fact that multinational ﬁrms usually have
higher capital intensity than domestic ﬁrms. Further, as an R&D proxy, we control for the share
of intangible assets in non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets, as this may affect domestic growth as well as
the returns to acquisitions and should account for the importance of knowledge and technology
for acquisitions. The working capital ratio deﬁned as the ratio between net current assets and
total assets reﬂects the ﬁrm’s liquidity and captures the ability to raise funds for an international
acquisition. Weincludepastsalesgrowthtocapturedifferingdomesticgrowthpathsbetweenac-
quirers and other ﬁrms before the deal to avoid a spurious correlation between domestic growth
and acquisitions.
The ﬁrms’ internationalization status and past M&A activity before the deal is captured by
anexportingdummyinthepreciousyear, andthenationalandcross-borderdealvariables. These
variables take the value one if the ﬁrm had acquired at least one national or foreign target in the
three years before the deal, respectively. Further, a variable with three categories that reﬂects the
change in the number of foreign subsidiaries is included (no change, increase, or decrease in the
11The alternative estimation strategy using material inputs instead of investment as suggested in
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) is not an option as this variable is not available for the UK sample. However,
we found that measures of TFP constructed with materials instead of investment in France were very
similar.
12For example Arnold & Hussinger (2006) for Germany, Girma et al. (2004) for Ireland, Benfratello &
Razzolini (2007), for Italy, and Damijan et al. (2007) for Slovenia, among others.
14number of foreign subsidiaries owned).
The age of a ﬁrm in years can be interpreted as a reﬂection of learning (Jovanovic, 1982) and
is included as the logarithm of the number of years since incorporation as a further control for
growth potentials and experience. In addition, a dummy controlling for the legal form equals one
if the acquirer is a public limited company. Finally, differences in technological opportunities
and the competitive environment are accounted for by industry dummies at the NACE two-digit
industry level. A set of time dummies captures macroeconomic factors such as changes in the
business cycle or exchange rate movements. All variables are measured one period before the
cross-border M&A.
5 Results
Results from the Logit estimation for the probability to invest abroad are shown in table 1. A
higher ﬁrm size in terms of employment or capital stock makes it more likely to engage in an
international acquisition. The positive coefﬁcient for sales growth shows that ﬁrms that invest
abroad display higher domestic growth rates before the acquisition. The working capital ratio
coefﬁcient indicates that insufﬁcient internal ﬁnance could be an impediment to cross-border
M&As. International acquirers seem to have higher innovation potentials and employees with
higher skills as indicated by the positive coefﬁcients for intangible assets and wages, respec-
tively. This supports the idea of technology and knowledge as a driving factor for cross-border
M&As.
Past M&A activity – both national and international – appears to be an important predictor
of cross-border M&As in subsequent periods. The same is true for changes in the number of
foreign subsidiaries owned by the ﬁrm and previous export activities - although this effect is
only signiﬁcant for British ﬁrms. This seems plausible, as the knowledge of a ﬁrm gained in ear-
lier operations at a global stage reduces uncertainties related to foreign market entry and makes
the successful realization of cross-border M&As more likely. The exporting status of French
ﬁrms does not explain further international activity signiﬁcantly. One possible explanation is
that differences in the average ﬁrm size between acquirers and non-acquirers are much more
pronounced in the U.K. as can be seen in table 2 and 3. These tables also show that the dif-
ferences in the fraction of exporters between the unmatched groups are also much larger in the
British sample. Foreign-owned ﬁrms have a lower probability to invest abroad, probably since
they already have access to foreign markets and technologies. So far, the results are in line with
the expectations.
Surprisingly, TFP has no signiﬁcant effect on the probability of cross-border acquisitions
in the case of French ﬁrms, while British ﬁrms that engage in acquisitions seem to be less
15productive conditional on all other regressors. This does not necessarily contradict the results
fromtheFDIliteraturepredictingapositiveassociationbetweenaﬁrm’sproductivityanditsFDI
propensity. The reason is the inclusion of further variables as proxies for skills and innovation
in our estimation equation apart from TFP levels. Those variables are important determinants of
ﬁrm heterogeneity and productivity differences and are positively correlated with foreign market
entry. Tables 2 and 3 show that unconditional on these control variables ﬁrms that engage in
cross-border M&A are signiﬁcantly more productive.
The success of the matching procedure is documented in table 2 and 3. The means of the
covariates used in the logit equation of the unmatched sample are compared in order to quantify
the ex-ante differences between acquirers and the comparison group. Selection into treatment is
reﬂected in almost all variables.
The matching procedure is able to reduce a substantial amount of bias resulting from dif-
ferences in the observed covariates. As the test statistics show, the differences between the two
groups are small and insigniﬁcant for all variables used for the estimation of the propensity score
after the matching. Most importantly, there is practically no difference in the propensity score
between the two groups within each country, which is conﬁrmed by an inspection of the shape
of the propensity score distribution of both groups (compare ﬁgures 1 and 2). There, we also
see that imposing the common support condition does not reduce the sample signiﬁcantly (six
French and two British acquirers are dropped).
Table 4 displays the results from the difference-in-differences estimation for the various
outcome measures. Compared to other ﬁrms, both French and British international acquirers
realize higher output growth. Thus, overall cross-border acquisitions do not seem to substitute
domestic production. On the contrary, they are associated with higher domestic sales growth
in both countries. This complementarity between foreign and domestic activity is accompanied
by signiﬁcant faster growth of capital and employment. The results differ across countries,
however, when it comes to the resulting productivity effects. The growth of TFP is about 4%
and 7% larger for French ﬁrms that engage in international acquisitions in the year of the deal
and in the ﬁrst year after the deal, respectively, compared to ﬁrms that do not engage in cross-
border acquisitions. This difference becomes insigniﬁcant after two years, however. British
ﬁrms that engage in cross-border acquisitions do not achieve signiﬁcantly higher growth in TFP.
While the size of the effects on sales and employment are comparable, the capital growth rate is
even higher, resulting in an insigniﬁcant TFP effect in the U.K. sample.
As stressed previously, results might vary depending on the underlying motivation for the
deal. So we are interested to see if there is some heterogeneity in the results. Therefore, we
divide the sample with the aim to discriminate between different types of deals. Doing this, we
16also try to shed some further light on the observed cross-country differences in the productivity
result, wherethecompositionofthedealscoulddrivetheobservedeffectsonaverage. Therefore,
we perform additional calculations for different types of deals.
Foreign market access is the goal of horizontal foreign investments and as described in the
data section, we now use related deals to approximate this type of investments. The remaining
deals are classiﬁed as unrelated. In table 5, results for separate estimations for the different deal
types are depicted. In our French estimation sample, 52% of the ﬁrms acquired only targets in
the same two-digit NACE industry, and 42% invested in unrelated deals. For 6% of the acquiring
ﬁrms, deals of both types are recorded within one year. In the analysis, we exclude ﬁrms that
engaged in more than one type of acquisition in one year as they are too few to dislpay them
separately and adding them to the other categories would water down the distinction, therefore
the number of acquiring ﬁrms do not necessarily add up to the overall amount. We see only
weak evidence for positive effects on productivity growth for French ﬁrms that engage in one
type of deal only. The positive effect on sales is more pronounced for unrelated deals and the
positive effect on investment shown in table 4 seems to be a result of unrelated deals to a large
extent. For the British sample, the results do not vary as much across deal types. 53% of the
ﬁrms have only related deals within one year, and this group obviously dominates the general
results. The seperate estimation of related and unrelated deals thus does not extract differential
behavior clearly. Although this distinction is quite often applied in empirical work, deﬁning
within-industry deals as horizontal FDI as opposed to across-industry investment is quite a crude
approximation that probably does not reﬂect perfectly the differences in the motives for the deals
(see Alfaro & Charlton, 2007, for a discussion).
Another way to approximate the type of investment would be to split the sample according
to the target country or region. The motive to gain access to cheaper factor inputs should lead
to cross-border acquisitions in low-cost countries, whereas market-seeking motives can be as-
sumed for investments in large, equally developed countries. As one could have expected, most
French ﬁrms invest in other Western European countries for their economic, geographic,and
cultural proximity. The second highest share is directed towards the U.S., where access to the
technological frontier might be decisive in addition to the large market. British ﬁrms, on the
contrary, prefer U.S. targets and Western European countries are the second largest target region
in terms of the number of deals (compare the ﬁrst two colums in table 6). Hence, factor costs
do not seem to be a main driver of acquisitions in our sample. This is in line with theoretical
models that predict FDI motivated by differences in production costs to take mostly the form
of Greenﬁeld investment (Nocke & Yeaple, 2008). Splitting the sample according to the target
regions does not generate new insights as the number of observations for investment in low-cost
countries is too small and we face the problem of multiple deals and target regions per ﬁrm
17again. The results are therefore not presented.
In an alternative approach, we take a closer look at the industry composition of the deals.
Thinking of knowledge and technology access as an important factor behind acquisitions, we use
an industry classiﬁcation that groups activities in the manufacturing and service sector according
to the importance of technology and knowledge. Tables 7 and 8 show the industry composition
of cross-border deals in France and the U.K, respectively. While in both countries international
acquisitions happen most frequently in the knowledge intensive service industries, acquisitions
of French ﬁrms are even more biased towards knowledge intensive service sector, where almost
half of all acquisitions belong to in our estimation sample.
In France, the positive effect on sales is quite robust across the four subgroups. Again, we
cannot ﬁnd any evidence for a negative employment effect. Interestingly, the overall signiﬁ-
cantly positive effect on domestic labor demand stems precisely from industries that are less
technology oriented. Furthermore, less knowledge intensive services cause the overall capital
effect. The positive productivity effects for French ﬁrms seem to be predominantly driven by
deals of acquirers in technology and knowledge intensive industries, where the productivity dif-
ferences are most pronounced and signiﬁcant. The point estimates for other services are even
negative, however not signiﬁcant.
The differences across industries are less pronounced for British ﬁrms. Sales and production
inputs grow signiﬁcantly faster for acquiring ﬁrms within all types of industries. We observe
a signiﬁcantly positive productivity effect of international acquisitions only in high-tech manu-
facturing. Hence, in both countries, there are industries, where cross-border acquirers show a
signiﬁcant higher TFP growth and this seems to be mainly the case in high-tech industries. One
possible explanation is that in technology intensive industries, acquirers focus on access to com-
plementary foreign technologies and knowledge that improve domestic efﬁciency. Investments
in low technology sectors might be undertaken to gain access to the target’s market and products
rather than to acquire complementary technologies. This view is supported if we take another
look at table 6. Overall, 11% of the French acquirers and 28.% of the British cross-border ac-
quirers invest in the U.S. In the high-tech manufacturing sectors, however, this share is highest
and is about ten percentage points above the average in each of the two countries. Thus, pre-
cisely in the sectors with an above average share of deals in the most technologically advanced
region, we ﬁnd positive productivity effects supporting the view of technology-seeking motives
for these deals.
All in all, the results indicate that cross-border acquisitions yield higher domestic production
and in some cases efﬁciency gains in the home country. Neither do we ﬁnd that international
acquisitions substitute domestic investment, nor are there adverse effects on employment growth
for any of the two countries and any of the four industries. At ﬁrst sight, our results suggest that
18there is some heterogeneity in the impact of international acquisitions across countries and types
of deals with respect to the effect on the productivity growth of the acquirers. However, if we
consider the industrial composition of cross-border deals, we ﬁnd a positive productivity effect
in technology-intensive sectors in both countries.
6 Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks.13 First, we vary the chosen threshold for the deals con-
sidered in our analysis. While we showed the estimation results for the 25% threshold sample,
the displayed results do practically not change considering deals where the acquirer obtains a
majority-interest after the acquisition. A look at the distribution of the acquired stake reveals
that there are quite a lot of deals with very small changes around one per cent only that stem
from repeated share buy back activity. The two peaks of the distribution can be found at 50% and
100%. Thus we have only little variation across the two samples. We further checked whether
ﬁrms with multiple acquisitions led to an overestimation of the average treatment effect. Cal-
culating the effects for ﬁrms with only one acquisition per year separately - which is the case
in the majority of the observations - changes the results only slightly. The same holds true for
the British sample if alternatively ﬁrms with the ﬁrst acquisition after at least three years are
considered, while the productivity effects disappears in the French case.
A further decision that we have to make is the number of years that we follow the effects
of the deals. On the one hand, potential restructuring measures might take some time to come
into effect, so a longer time horizon would be an interesting extension. On the other hand, the
longer the time passed by after a deal, the more likely is the occurrence of another event that
could interfere with the effects of the acquisition we aim to measure. In addition, even the basic
speciﬁcation is already quite data demanding as we need data for all important variables for four
consecutive years (or even ﬁve years for variables of which we use growth rates as controls in
the logit equation). Including the third year after the deal in the analysis thus reduces the sample
quite substantially. As a consequence, some of the effects loose their statistical signiﬁcance. All
results, however, still indicate the same direction of the effects and effects even increase in the
third period after the deal.
The inclusion of the smallest ﬁrms in a country is another variation in the deﬁnition of the
estimation sample. In our main speciﬁcation we decided to exclude ﬁrms with a median value
of annual sales and total assets below e2 million based on all available ﬁrm-year observations.
13Results are available from the authors upon request.
19However, removing this restriction and using all ﬁrms in the sample again does not change the
results notably.
Further robustness checks relate to the assumption of selection on observables. To account
for possible differences in the growth trends of the two groups, we included the last years sales
growth as a conditioning variable in the estimation of the propensity to acquirer a foreign ﬁrm.
One could argue for the inclusion of the past changes of all dependent variables of interest in
order to control for varying trends in the evolution of the ﬁrms’ productivity level, capital, or
employment. Includingallbutonegrowthratesdoesnotchangeourresults.14 Thisindicatesthat
the inclusion of a large number of controls in the logit estimation captures already a substantial
part of the important differences between the two groups of ﬁrms.
Although the results of the matching procedure seem to be robust to introducing further
covariates, we cannot formally test the assumption of selection on observables. However, it is
possibleto calculatethemagnitude ofthebias thatwouldbe necessarytooutweighour estimated
treatment effects. For this purpose we display Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002), which
indicate the minimum value by which an unobserved factor would have to change the odds ratio
of a matched pair i and j
𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑖𝑡)(1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑖𝑡))
𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑗𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑗𝑡)(1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝐵𝑗𝑡 =1 ∣𝑋𝑗𝑡)
(6)
to reduce the signiﬁcance of our estimated average treatment effect on the treated below a certain
conﬁdence level.
The results show that – given conventional levels of signiﬁcance – the critical values for
domestic sales, capital and employment growth vary between 1.2 for capital growth for French
ﬁrms and above 2.0 for employment growth in the British sample. A factor that could change
the odds ratio even by a factor of the lower bound of 1.2 in France would have to have a larger
effect on the probability of an acquisition than an increase of the number of employees in the
pre-acquisition period by 50% or an increase in the capital stock by 70%.15 Note also that this
factor must in addition completely determine the observed difference in the outcome variables
of acquiring ﬁrms and the comparison group. Given that our propensity score estimates control
for a large set of covariates including the main determinants from the theoretical and empirical
14We have to exclude one growth rate and one level to avoid multicollinearity problems as the TFP
measure is a linear combination of the factor inputs and output. We excluded the TFP growth rate and
the sales levels.
15Transforming the estimated coeﬃcients of the logit model into odds ratios led to values of 1.279 for
capital and 1.384 in the French sample. The critical values for TFP are as expected quite low, as they
were only partly signiﬁcant in our main speciﬁcations.
20literature, we argue that it is unlikely that an omitted factor has such a large effect on both the
propensity to engage in a cross-border acquisition and the domestic growth of sales, employment
and capital. In conclusion, it does not seem very plausible that our estimated positive effects of
cross-border acquisitions on domestic growth are entirely due to omitted variables.
Furthermore, we use labor productivity (sales per employee) as an alternative productiv-
ity measure instead of TFP. While the Olley & Pakes method used to construct a consistent
TFP measure takes into account some of the major estimation problems, it critically hinges on
functional form restrictions and instrument variables and it is constructed only from ﬁrms with
positive investments.16 Similarly to our previous results we ﬁnd positive productivity effects for
French ﬁrms, but insigniﬁcant effects for British ﬁrms. The results for the industry classiﬁcation
again show positive productivity effects only in technology-intensive industries.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our results to using alternative matching algo-
rithms.17 In our baseline speciﬁcation we use only one control observation as a match where the
one with the closest propensity score is chosen irrespective of the actual distance. First, we im-
plement caliper matching imposing a maximum distance of 0.1 for the difference in propensity
scores within each matched pair. Second, some alternative matching algorithms that use a larger
number of matches for each acquiring ﬁrm are applied to reduce the variance of the estimator.
However, this comes at the cost of an increased potential bias as on average the matching quality
is lower. We perform radius matching with a maximum bandwidth of 0.1, which uses all ﬁrms
from the comparison group within a maximum distance in the propensity score of 0.1. Further,
we show the results using three instead of only one nearest neighbor combined with a caliper of
0.1. The sensitivity of the results with respect to the primary matching criterion – the propensity
core – are analyzed by the use of a Mahalanobis matching estimator that chooses a nearest neigh-
bor not only with respect to the propensity score, but gives additional weight to a ﬁrmt’s industry,
age and the year of acquisition, as these variables might be especially important determinants of
ﬁrm growth. This comes at the cost of a large sample reduction as we lose several matches due
to the common support condition. Next, some variants of a kernel matching estimator that uses
a weighted average of all ﬁrms in the comparison group to construct the counterfactual. The
weights for the kernel estimator are based on the differences in the propensity score between
acquirors and ﬁrms from the comparison group and a normal and alternatively a uniform kernel
function. Using kernel funtions, an even more important choice than the speciﬁc kernel function
16In both samples, labor productivity and TFP à la Olley and Pakes are highly correlated with a
correlation coeﬃcient of 0.98.
17See Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) for an overview on these methods.
21seems to be the bandwidth of the estimator (see again Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Consider-
ing the implied trade-off between variance and potential bias, we re-ran the matching procedure
with a bandwidth of 0.2 and 0.02. The estimations show that our main ﬁndings are robust to
using alternative matching estimators. For both countries we ﬁnd large and highly signiﬁcant
effects on the domestic growth of sales, employment and capital. Positive productivity effects
only show up for French ﬁrms, but they are not signiﬁcant in all cases.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides ﬁrst results for the effects of cross-border deals on the investing ﬁrms’
domestic performance. Applying a combination of matching techniques with a difference-in-
differences estimator, we ﬁnd that acquiring ﬁrms in cross-border deals yield higher growth
rates of domestic sales, employment, and capital. Further, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant productivity ef-
fects for French acquirers only but not for British ﬁrms. Separate analysis of related and unre-
lated deals and the differentiation of four industry types shed further light on the composition
of the deals behind these effects. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects on total factor productivity for
technology-intensive industries only, which suggests that ﬁrms within these industries acquire
complementary technologies abroad. This view is supported by the fact that the largest share
of deals in these sectors target U.S. ﬁrms. Domestic growth is positively related to cross-border
acquisitions in virtually all industry types and employment growth and investment is not nega-
tively affected at the acquiring ﬁrm. We conclude that domestic activity is on average positively
affected by cross-border M&As, but the effects of cross-border M&As depend also on the mo-
tives for the deal. Heterogeneity in the productivity effects probably cannot be explained with
acquirer characteristics only, but depend on the role and complementarities of technology and
knowledge in both the acquiring and target ﬁrm, and industry speciﬁc characteristics as well.
Future research might shed more light on the factors that determine this heterogeneity. The
apparently positive effects on the investing ﬁrms should be taken into account when evaluating
the welfare effects of cross-border M&As and when considering policy measures that impose
restrictions on cross-border M&As.
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Balancing test – France.
bias t-test
% reduc- equal
Sample Treated Comparison bias tion means p-value
TFP Unmatched 1.129 0.750 52.0 8.65 0.000
Matched 1.111 1.167 -7.7 85.2 -0.84 0.400
Wage Unmatched 4.051 3.590 104.5 20.09 0.000
Matched 4.038 4.019 4.3 95.9 0.47 0.640
Sales Unmatched 0.099 0.051 18.6 3.41 0.001
growth Matched 0.098 0.107 -3.4 81.6 -0.38 0.703
Capital Unmatched 8.471 6.303 99.6 21.57 0.000
Matched 8.398 8.623 -10.4 89.6 -1.01 0.315
Labor Unmatched 5.609 4.047 96.4 22.74 0.000
Matched 5.565 5.839 -16.9 82.5 -1.61 0.109
Intangible Unmatched 0.326 0.190 46.7 8.36 0.000
assets Matched 0.324 0.323 0.4 99.2 0.04 0.968
Working Unmatched 0.129 0.175 -18.3 -3.05 0.002
capital ratio Matched 0.131 0.162 -12.4 32.6 -1.50 0.135
Exporter Unmatched 0.596 0.546 10.3 1.67 0.095
Matched 0.598 0.598 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
National Unmatched 0.322 0.007 94.0 61.87 0.000
deals Matched 0.311 0.295 4.5 95.2 0.38 0.705
Cross-border Unmatched 0.430 0.003 120.9 115.81 0.000
deals Matched 0.417 0.383 9.7 92.0 0.80 0.425
Δ foreign Unmatched 0.474 0.025 102.0 40.18 0.000
subsidaries Matched 0.462 0.485 -5.2 94.9 -0.47 0.638
Foreign Unmatched 0.052 0.106 -20.0 -2.87 0.004
owner Matched 0.053 0.049 1.4 92.9 0.20 0.844
Legal form Unmatched 0.785 0.346 98.6 15.14 0.000
Matched 0.780 0.792 -2.6 97.4 -0.32 0.751
Age Unmatched 3.189 2.964 26.8 4.80 0.000
Matched 3.174 3.150 2.9 89.3 0.32 0.746
Propensity Unmatched 0.217 0.002 103.0 156.82 0.000
score Matched 0.201 0.201 0.1 99.9 0.01 0.992
30Table 3
Balancing test – United Kingdom.
bias t-test
% reduc- equal
Sample Treated Comparison bias tion means p-value
TFP Unmatched 1.085 0.980 12.9 2.92 0.004
Matched 1.084 1.094 -1.2 90.5 -0.26 0.792
Wage Unmatched 3.858 3.657 42.1 10.03 0.000
Matched 3.859 3.880 -4.5 89.4 -0.85 0.394
Sales Unmatched 0.099 0.062 10.5 2.78 0.006
growth Matched 0.099 0.096 0.6 94.1 0.11 0.911
Capital Unmatched 10.752 7.724 125.3 37.59 0.000
Matched 10.742 10.887 -6.0 95.2 -0.93 0.351
Labor Unmatched 7.457 4.713 148.2 48.77 0.000
Matched 7.450 7.496 -2.5 98.3 -0.38 0.707
Intangible Unmatched 0.413 0.076 122.3 42.14 0.000
assets Matched 0.412 0.410 0.8 99.3 0.12 0.901
Working Unmatched 0.155 0.127 10.3 2.33 0.020
capital Matched 0.156 0.152 1.5 85.7 0.32 0.753
Exporter Unmatched 0.638 0.335 63.6 16.26 0.000
Matched 0.637 0.643 -1.3 97.9 -0.23 0.817
National Unmatched 0.489 0.029 123.5 68.31 0.000
deals Matched 0.491 0.503 -3.3 97.3 -0.45 0.656
Cross-border Unmatched 0.528 0.007 145.6 146.88 0.000
deals Matched 0.526 0.489 10.4 92.9 1.34 0.181
Δ foreign Unmatched 0.370 0.012 74.5 56.85 0.000
subsidieries Matched 0.368 0.373 -1.0 98.7 -0.13 0.893
Foreign Unmatched 0.037 0.113 -29.0 -6.06 0.000
owner Matched 0.037 0.037 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Legal form Unmatched 0.728 0.083 174.1 59.04 0.000
Matched 0.727 0.741 -3.8 97.8 -0.57 0.571
Age Unmatched 2.992 2.866 12.7 3.59 0.000
Matched 2.995 2.961 3.5 72.6 0.56 0.572
Propensity Unmatched 0.293 0.004 140.1 193.43 0.000
score Matched 0.291 0.291 0.0 100.0 0.01 0.996
31Figure 1
Propensity score density – France.
Figure 2
Propensity score density – U.K.
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